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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Monica Raab and defendant City of Ocean 
City, New Jersey (“Ocean City”) both appeal the District 
Court’s denial of their motions for attorney’s fees.  Raab 
argues that she is a “prevailing plaintiff,” for purposes of 
attorney’s fee eligibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in her civil 
suit against defendant Ocean City police officer Jessie Ruch.  
At issue in Raab’s appeal is whether a settling plaintiff in a 
civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the 
district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order 
incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement 
agreement.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that a 
plaintiff can be a “prevailing party” in such circumstances.  
Accordingly, we will reverse in part the District Court’s order 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 At issue in Ocean City’s cross-appeal is whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees 
to a prevailing defendant, when the District Court had 
previously granted summary judgment in the defendant’s 
favor.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion, and we will affirm the 





 In November 2011, Raab filed a civil complaint 
against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean City.  
Raab asserted numerous federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, as well as similar state law causes of action, which all 
stemmed from an incident in which Ruch detained Raab on 
May 10, 2010.1  On that day, Ruch stopped his patrol car 
                                              
1 The causes of action alleged in Raab’s initial complaint 
included federal and state claims of false arrest, excessive 
force, unlawful search, unreasonable seizure, supervisory 
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outside of Raab’s residence to investigate a trailer that had 
been parked on the street for about a month and had no 
license plate.  Ruch believed that the trailer was abandoned 
and contacted police dispatch to request that it be towed.  
Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside, spoke with Ruch, and 
informed him that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law 
and that she would move the trailer into her driveway.  Ruch 
told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried.  After Raab 
was unsuccessful in her attempt to move the trailer, she went 
inside her house to call her husband.  She then returned to the 
driveway and handed the phone to Ruch, who indicated that 
the trailer would not be towed if it was moved before a tow 
truck arrived.  At that point, another man drove by the house 
and offered to help move the trailer.  With his help, the trailer 
was moved into the driveway.   
 
 Ruch then asked Raab for her name.  The parties 
dispute whether Raab provided her name, and they dispute 
the resulting physical interaction.  Raab alleges that she 
responded “we are the Raabs,” but that Ruch then grabbed her 
arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground.  Appendix 
(“App.”) 51-52.  She alleges that, while she was on the 
ground, Ruch repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs, 
causing her arm to be pulled in different directions and her 
head to hit the ground several times.  Ruch disputes Raab’s 
version of events.  He claims that Raab refused to tell him her 
name, cursed at him, and then pushed him with her forearm.  
Ruch alleges that he then grabbed Raab by the arm, at which 
point she started slapping his hand and subsequently fell to 
the ground on her back.  See App. 52.  Ruch alleges that 
Raab, while on the ground, started flailing her legs.  Id.  Ruch 
indicated that he believed Raab was having a “psychological 
episode,” so he decided to detain her and call for his 
supervisor.  Id.  When the supervisor arrived, the supervisor 
called an ambulance for Raab and told Ruch to remove the 
handcuffs.  Later that day, Raab went to her primary care 
doctor, where she was diagnosed with various injuries.  
 
                                                                                                     
liability, failure to train, negligent supervision, assault and 
battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
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  Notably, approximately one month prior to the May 10 
incident, Ruch had received a negative performance notice for 
failing to detain a suspect in an unrelated incident.  The 
performance notice served as a “training tool” for Ruch, who 
indicated that this performance notice was “in the back of 
[his] mind” during the altercation with Raab.  App. 7.  
 
 Both Ruch and Ocean City filed motions for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted in part and denied in 
part Ruch’s motion for summary judgment.  The surviving 
claims against Ruch included federal and state claims for 
excessive force, a state claim for assault and battery, and a 
request for punitive damages.  The District Court also granted 
summary judgment in favor of Ocean City on all counts, 
having found that Raab could not establish “‘both (1) 
contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 
knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents; and (2) 
circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be 
found to have communicated a message of approval to the 
offending subordinate are present’” required to succeed on a 
municipal liability claim.  App. 68 (quoting Bonenberger v. 
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
Specifically, “[n]o reasonable jury could find that because 
Officer Ruch was previously told that he should have arrested 
a domestic violence suspect when probable cause existed to 
do so, his supervisors communicated a ‘message of approval’ 
to tackle citizens to the ground every time any suspect is 
arrested.”  App. 70.  
 
 Raab and Ruch requested a settlement conference with 
the Magistrate Judge to whom the case was referred for 
certain pre-trial proceedings.  At a November 25, 2014 
settlement conference held by the Magistrate Judge, Raab and 
Ruch agreed to resolve all outstanding claims for the total 
sum of $150,000, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs.  The 
parties agreed that the issue of attorney’s fees would be 
determined later by the District Court.  Shortly thereafter, 
Raab filed her motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.  Ocean City also filed a fee application with 
the District Court.  
 
 Prior to deciding Raab’s and Ocean City’s motions for 
attorney’s fees, the District Court entered an Order of 
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Dismissal on January 21, 2015.  The order dismissed the 
action without costs and provided:  “The terms of the 
settlement agreement are incorporated herein by reference 
and the Court shall retain jurisdiction over such agreement.”  
App. 230.  None of the parties objected to or appealed the 
District Court’s dismissal order.  The order did not include 
the actual terms of the settlement, and the District Court later 
indicated that it had not seen the settlement terms when it 
issued the dismissal order.  See App. 8.  A few days later, the 
parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, which 
simply stated that the parties have “stipulated and agreed that 
the same be and it is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, 
exclusive of the pending motions for attorney fees.”  App. 
231.2   
 
 On April 6, 2015, the District Court denied both 
Raab’s and Ocean City’s motions for attorney’s fees.  The 
District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing party,” as 
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  As to Ocean City, the District 
Court held that, although Ocean City was a prevailing 
defendant, the city had not demonstrated that Raab’s action 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation to justify 
the awarding of fees.  Both Raab and Ocean City timely 




 We review a district court’s denial of attorney’s fees 
for abuse of discretion.  P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 
F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).  “An abuse of discretion occurs 
when a district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
                                              
2 Raab’s counsel signed and dated the stipulation as of 
January 20, 2015.  Ruch’s counsel signed and dated the 
stipulation as of January 23, 2015.  The stipulation was filed 
and entered with the District Court on February 2, 2015.   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 




application of law to fact.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
However, if the fee application was denied based on the 
district court’s conclusions on questions of law, our review is 




 The first question before us is whether Raab is a 
“prevailing party” in her action against Ruch.  Under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(b), courts may, in their discretion, grant a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee” to a “prevailing party” in certain 
federal actions, including those proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.   
 
 The District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing 
party,” and accordingly did not award attorney’s fees.  In 
reaching this holding, the District Court indicated that “a 
party may only ‘prevail’ by obtaining either a judgment or a 
court-ordered consent decree.”  App. 5.  The District Court 
then determined that Raab had obtained neither:   
 
Plaintiff has not obtained a judgment on the 
merits; rather, Plaintiff and Officer Ruch 
entered into a private settlement agreement.  
Only “enforceable judgments on the merits and 
court-ordered consent decrees create the 
material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties necessary to permit an award of 
attorney’s fees.”  Buckhannon [Bd. and Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res.], 532 U.S. [598, 604 (2001)] (internal 
citations omitted).  While “settlement 
agreements enforced through a consent decree 
may serve as the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees,” id., that is not the situation that 
presents itself here, as no consent decree was 
entered to enforce the settlement agreement.  
 
App. 7-8.  We disagree. 
 
 The Supreme Court has set forth some useful 
guideposts for determining whether a plaintiff is a “prevailing 
party” for purposes of fee-shifting statutes.  In Buckhannon, 
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the Court distilled the following threshold inquiries under 
section 1988:  (1) whether there is a “‘material alteration of 
the legal relationship of the parties,’” and (2) whether that 
material alteration is “judicially sanctioned.”  532 U.S. at 
604-05 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).  We have observed 
generally that “[t]he Supreme Court has given a ‘generous 
formulation’ to the term ‘prevailing party.’”  Truesdell v. 
Phila. Housing Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); see 
also Cnty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 
535 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that normally, a “prevailing 
plaintiff should recover an award of attorney’s fees absent 




Regarding the first inquiry, a plaintiff must “receive at 
least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be 
said to prevail.”  Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987).  
This “inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief 
obtained.”  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992).  
Indeed, the Court has held that even an award of nominal 
damages will satisfy this test.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 
(citing Farrar, 506 U.S. 103).  As we have noted, “when . . . a 
material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties has 
occurred, ‘the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to 
the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the availability of a 
fee award vel non.’”  Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 166 (quoting Tex. 
State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 793). 
 
Although an award of relief may be issued by a court 
following consideration of the merits, “[t]he fact that [a 
plaintiff] prevailed through a settlement rather than through 
litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.  Nothing in the 
language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to 
award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial 
determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated.”  
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).  We have 
recognized, however, that “interim” relief — such a obtaining 
a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo — that is 
not in some way merit-based will not confer prevailing party 
status.  See, e.g., John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. 
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Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003); J.O. v. 
Orange Twp. Bd. of Ed., 287 F.3d 267, 272-74 (3d Cir. 
2002).   
 
This case involves the payment of $150,000 from 
Ruch to Raab pursuant to a settlement agreement that effected 
a final resolution of Raab’s case.  This indisputably 
constituted a material alteration of the legal relationship 




Regarding the second inquiry, the material alteration 
of the legal relationship between the parties requires a 
“judicial imprimatur on the change.”  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 
at 605; see also CRST Van Expedited v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 
1642, 1646 (2016) (“This change must be marked by judicial 
imprimatur.” (quotation marks omitted)).  Key to this 
determination is whether the change is enforceable or 
“judicially sanctioned” by the court.  See Buckhannon, 532 
U.S. at 604-05; Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111; John T., 318 F.3d at 
560; see also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (acknowledging 
that a party cannot be considered prevailing “unless there has 
been an enforceable alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties” (quotation marks omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
The Court in Buckhannon offered two “examples” meeting 
this standard:  “enforceable judgments on the merits” and 
“settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree.”  
Id. at 604-05.  However, the Court in Buckhannon determined 
that “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although 
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by 
the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the 
change” between the legal relationship of the parties.  Id. at 
605.         
 
The District Court held that only a judgment or 
consent decree — not the “private settlement agreement” the 
parties entered into — could constitute the basis to permit 
Raab to be a prevailing party.  App. 7-8.  While settlement 
agreements reached “through negotiations out of court” alone 
may lack the necessary judicial imprimatur, John T., 318 F.3d 
at 560, the facts of this case differ. 
10 
 
A settling plaintiff may be entitled to attorney’s fees if 
the district court has ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms 
of a settlement agreement.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that generally, a federal district court does not 
have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, even 
though the original dispute may have been before the court.  
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 
380-81 (1994).  However, a district court will have ancillary 
jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, permitting the court 
to enforce the agreement, when “the terms of the settlement 
agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal — 
either by separate provision (such as a provision ‘retaining 
jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by 
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the 
order.”  Id. at 381.  The Court in Buckhannon acknowledged, 
as a result, that “federal jurisdiction to enforce a private 
contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms 
of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.”  
532 U.S. at 604 n.7.  Accordingly, a district court’s retaining 
ancillary jurisdiction over the settlement agreement or 
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the 
order of dismissal confers the judicial imprimatur that is 
required for a plaintiff to become a prevailing party under 
section 1988.  See Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 163-65 (holding that 
a settling plaintiff was a prevailing party when the court order 
contained “mandatory language,” was entitled “Order,” 
“b[ore] the signature of the District Court judge,” and gave 
the plaintiff “the right to request judicial enforcement of the 
settlement”).  
 
 Turning to the case before us, we note that the District 
Court’s dismissal order both explicitly incorporated the terms 
of the settlement agreement and retained jurisdiction to 
enforce the agreement.  The order provided:  “The terms of 
the settlement agreement are incorporated herein by reference 
and the Court shall retain jurisdiction over such agreement.”  
App. 230.  We therefore hold that the settlement agreement 
had the necessary judicial imprimatur to confer prevailing 
party status. 
 
 Ruch urges us to disregard the explicit language 
incorporating the settlement terms because the District Court 
did not actually see the settlement agreement prior to issuing 
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its dismissal order.  This argument is unavailing.  Although it 
may be a good practice for a district court to examine a 
settlement agreement prior to incorporating its terms, Ruch 
points to no case law requiring a district court to do so in 
order to effectively retain jurisdiction over a settlement.  In a 
similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that a district court’s retention of jurisdiction over the 
enforcement of a settlement provided “sufficient judicial 
sanction to convey prevailing party status on plaintiffs,” even 
though the district court had not “scrutinize[d] the 
settlement’s fairness or conduct[ed] any review of the terms 
of the Agreement before endorsing the stipulation dismissing 
the suit.”  Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 80, 84 (2d Cir. 
2003).  The circumstances here are also vastly different from 
those we considered in John T.  There, we held that the 
plaintiff’s relief was not “judicially sanctioned” when the 
parties developed a mutual resolution “through negotiations 
out of court,” and where there was no other form of judicial 
sanction over the parties’ mutually agreed upon resolution.  
318 F.3d at 560.  But here, the operative order dismissing the 
case contains explicit language incorporating the settlement 
terms and retaining jurisdiction in the District Court — 
providing the requisite “judicial sanction” over the settlement 
agreement.4 
 
 Ruch also urges us to ignore the plain language in the 
District Court’s dismissal order stating that the settlement 
terms were incorporated.  Instead, Ruch argues that we should 
defer to the District Court’s later interpretation of its 
dismissal order.  See Ruch Br. 16-17.  In its order denying 
attorney’s fees, the District Court noted that “the terms of the 
settlement were not actually included” and that the court “did 
not facilitate the settlement, has never seen the settlement 
agreement, nor was it aware of any terms contained within the 
agreement when the Order was issued.”  App. 8.  However, 
the case relied on by Ruch — United States v. Spallone, 399 
                                              
4 We also note that, unlike in John T., the settlement occurred 
with the help of an active magistrate judge in the federal 
district courthouse in Camden, New Jersey.  This likely gave 
the District Court some assurance that the terms of the 
agreement were appropriate to become part of a court order.   
12 
 
F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) — concerns a district court’s 
construction of an “ambiguity in his own words.”  Here, the 
dismissal order was unambiguous:  by its own terms it 
incorporated the settlement terms and retained jurisdiction.   
 
 Ruch next argues that the retention of jurisdiction 
clause is invalid because the parties did not consent to 
ancillary jurisdiction over later enforcement of the settlement.  
Ruch Br. 23-25 (citing Am. Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement at 
the request of the parties), and Roberson, 346 F.3d at 83 
(noting that its holding that a settlement agreement was 
judicially sanctioned was “strengthened” by clause in 
settlement providing that it would not become effective if 
order of discontinuance did not include a provision retaining 
jurisdiction over enforcement)).  However, neither of the 
cases cited by Ruch hold that a district court can only retain 
jurisdiction of the enforcement of a settlement if the parties 
include a provision stating as such in their settlement 
agreement or otherwise consent to the court’s jurisdiction.  
We reject Ruch’s argument and hold that a district court may 
sua sponte retain ancillary jurisdiction in the circumstances of 
this case.5 
                                              
5 As discussed infra, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) 
authorized the District Court to enter the dismissal order with 
the provisions incorporating the settlement agreement and 
retaining ancillary jurisdiction.  Ruch, however, claims that 
the District Court was “wholly without legal authority,” Ruch 
Br. 32, to include these provisions because District of New 
Jersey Local Civil Rule 41.1(b) “does not contain language 
which would allow a trial judge to add conditions or terms to 
the Order of Dismissal, such as the retention of jurisdiction 
over the settlement language.”  Id.  Local Civil Rule 41.1(b) 
provides: 
 
When a case has been settled, 
counsel shall promptly notify the 
Clerk and the Court, thereafter 
confirming the same in writing.  
Within 21 days of such 
notification, counsel shall file all 
13 
 
                                                                                                     
papers necessary to terminate the 
case.  Upon failure of counsel to 
do so, the Clerk shall prepare an 
order for submission to the Court 
dismissing the action, without 
costs, and without prejudice to the 
right to reopen the action within 
60 days upon good cause shown if 
the settlement is not 
consummated. 
L. Civ. R. 41.1(b) (D.N.J.).   
 
 We reject Ruch’s argument for at least four reasons.  
First, Ruch provides no case law to support his argument.  
The District Court of New Jersey has instead confirmed that 
the decision whether “to retain ancillary jurisdiction over the 
settlement agreement is discretionary” in these circumstances.  
Brass Smith, LLC v. RPI Indus., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 377, 
381 (D.N.J. 2011); see also id. (“[A] court is under no 
obligation to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, 
but may do so if it chooses.”); Wright v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am., 285 F. Supp. 2d 515, 522 n.17 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The 
exercise of [ancillary] jurisdiction to enforce its own order is 
discretionary; the court [is] under no obligation to reserve 
[jurisdiction] in the first place.”).  Second, Local Rule 41.1(b) 
does not, by its terms, restrict or modify the court’s authority 
in any way.  The rule merely supplements Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(a), inter alia, to create a procedure for 
attorneys to notify the court when a case settles “as soon as 
possible so that the Court will not waste further effort on the 
case and so that it can readjust its calendar.”  Allyn Z. Lite, 
N.J. Federal Practice Rules, Rule 41.1(b), cmt. 3 (2015).  
Third, Ruch’s argument presumes that a local rule may 
override the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — which is not 
possible.  See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1987); 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); N.J.  L. Civ. R. 1.1 (noting that 
the New Jersey Local Civil Rules “supplement the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . and are applicable in all 
proceedings when not inconsistent therewith”).  Fourth, we 
note that Ruch did not object to the District Court’s dismissal 
order, which was entered on January 21, 2015.  Nor did he 
14 
 
 When case law does mention parties’ consent to 
ancillary jurisdiction, it is often in the context of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) voluntary dismissals.  
Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), a plaintiff can dismiss an action 
without a court order by filing “a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by all parties who have appeared.”  See State Nat’l Ins. 
Co. v. Cnty. of Camden, -- F.3d --, --, 2016 WL 2990975, at 
*5 (3d Cir. 2016).  “‘[A]ny action by the district court after 
the filing of [the Stipulation of Dismissal] can have no force 
or effect because the matter has already been dismissed.’”  Id. 
(alterations in original) (quoting SmallBizPros, Inc. v. 
MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010)).  But here, as 
the dismissal order was filed before the stipulated dismissal, 
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not govern.  Instead, as the Supreme 
Court has indicated, district courts may retain jurisdiction 
without the parties’ consent in Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal orders:  
 
When the dismissal is pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(a)(2), which specifies that the 
action “shall not be dismissed at 
the plaintiff’s instance save upon 
order of the court and upon such 
terms and conditions as the court 
deems proper,” the parties’ 
compliance with the terms of the 
settlement contract (or the court’s 
“retention of jurisdiction” over the 
settlement contract) may, in the 
court’s discretion, be one of the 
terms set forth in the order.  Even 
when, as occurred here, the 
dismissal is pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(1)(ii) (which does not by its 
terms empower a district court to 
attach conditions to the parties’ 
stipulation of dismissal) we think 
the court is authorized to embody 
the settlement contract in its 
                                                                                                     
file a motion to reconsider or appeal that order.  See Raab 
Reply Br. 13.  Thus, no challenge to the dismissal order itself 
is properly before us. 
15 
 
dismissal order (or, what has the 
same effect, retain jurisdiction 
over the settlement contract) if the 
parties agree. 
 
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82.  The Supreme Court in 
Kokkonen made clear that, for court dismissals made 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a 
district court may, in its discretion, “attach conditions to the 
parties’ stipulation of dismissal” — including the retention of 
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.  Id.  Thus, the 
absence of a settlement term providing the parties’ consent 
does not render unenforceable the District Court’s retention 
of jurisdiction in a dismissal order under Rule 41(a)(2).   
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 We conclude that Raab was a prevailing party under 
section 1988.  Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s 
order denying Raab attorney’s fees, and remand so that the 
District Court can determine, within its discretion, the 





 We turn to defendant Ocean City’s cross-appeal 
challenging the District Court’s denial of its motion for 
attorney’s fees.  It is beyond dispute that Ocean City was a 
“prevailing party,” as none of the claims asserted against the 
city survived the District Court’s order granting Ocean City’s 
motion for summary judgment.   
 
 Although a prevailing party can be either a plaintiff or 
a defendant, “the standard for awarding attorney’s fees to 
prevailing defendants is more stringent than that for awarding 
fees to prevailing plaintiffs.”  Barnes Found. v. Twp. of 
Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001).  Even 
when a defendant is a prevailing party in a section 1983 
action, he may recover attorney’s fees “only if the District 
Court finds that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought 
in subjective bad faith.”  Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 
16 
 
(1980) (quotation marks omitted); accord CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016) 
(“When a defendant is the prevailing party on a civil rights 
claim, the Court has held, district courts may award attorney’s 
fees if the plaintiff’s ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless,’ or if ‘the plaintiff continued to litigate after it 
clearly became so.’” (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978))).  Attorney’s fees for 
prevailing defendants under this standard are “not routine, but 
are to be only sparingly awarded.”  Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 
934 F.2d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 1991).  “The fact that a plaintiff 
may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient 
justification for the assessment of fees.”  Hughes, 449 U.S. at 
14.  Even if a plaintiff’s allegations are ultimately “legally 
insufficient to require a trial,” that alone is not enough to 
render the plaintiff’s cause of action “groundless” or “without 
foundation.”  Id. at 15-16.6    
 
 On appeal, Ocean City contends that the District Court 
did not use the proper analysis for deciding its fee application 
and abused its discretion in denying its fee application.  
Ocean City argues that the District Court failed to address 
properly the argument that Raab’s claims lacked a factual 
                                              
6 In the Title VII context — where an analogous “frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation” standard is employed 
— we have indicated that when determining whether an 
award of counsel fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate, 
“courts should consider several factors including (1) whether 
the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the 
defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court 
dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on 
the merits.”  E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 751 
(3d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted).  Other factors that a 
court may consider are “whether the question in issue was 
one of first impression requiring judicial resolution,” and 
whether “the controversy is based sufficiently upon a real 
threat of injury to the plaintiff.”  Barnes Found., 242 F.3d at 
158.  “These considerations, however, are merely guidelines, 
not strict rules; thus determinations regarding frivolity are to 
be made on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. (quotation and 
alteration marks omitted).  
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foundation, and claims that the District Court only focused on 
“reasonableness” and whether the claims were “frivolous.”   
 
 In denying Ocean City’s fee application, the District 
Court explicitly held that Raab’s claims were not frivolous or 
without foundation, and were reasonable.  App. 6-7.  The 
District Court, accordingly, employed the correct legal 
standard to evaluate Ocean City’s fee application.  Nor did 
the District Court abuse its discretion in holding that, at the 
time Raab filed her complaint, it was not unreasonable for 
Raab to allege inadequate training and supervision by Ocean 
City.  Deficient training or supervision may form the basis for 
section 1983 liability against a municipality when “both (1) 
contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 
knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents; and (2) 
circumstances under which the supervisor’s inaction could be 
found to have communicated a message of approval to the 
offending subordinate are present.”  Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 
25 (quotation marks omitted).  In reaching its conclusion, the 
District Court determined that Raab had undisputed evidence 
that one month prior to Raab’s arrest, Ruch had been issued a 
“Performance Notice” wherein “he was counseled by his 
supervisors for his lack of assertiveness and inability to take 
command in handling an unrelated incident.”  App. 7.  The 
District Court noted that Ruch had admitted that this 
counseling was “in the back of [his] mind” during the 
altercation with Raab.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  The 
court reasoned that such evidence made it “not unreasonable 
for [Raab] to argue [municipal liability claims] based upon 
these facts.”  Id.  Further, the District Court noted that Ocean 
City and Ruch made a joint settlement offer to Raab, which 
“further supports the reasonableness of the claims asserted 
against Ocean City.”  App. 7 n.1; see E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster 
Co., 123 F.3d 746, 751 (3d Cir. 1997) (indicating that 
whether “the defendant offered to settle” is a factor for 
determining whether an award of attorney’s fees to a 
prevailing defendant is appropriate).  
 
 We hold that the District Court acted within its 
discretion in finding that Raab’s claims were not frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.  The District Court’s 
decision did not rest “upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
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to fact.”  Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d at 852 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Therefore, we will affirm the District 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order denying Raab’s motion for attorney’s fees and 
will remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  We will affirm, however, the District 
Court’s order denying Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s 
fees.    
 
